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Newcastle University 
 
Albert Weale’s Democratic Justice and the Social Contract makes a highly original, 
significant contribution to our understanding of the nature of democracy.
1
  This is no small 
feat when new books on democracy appear almost daily.  Of course, democracy is a very 
broad topic, but Weale is specifically concerned with the conditions under which democratic 
decision procedures produce fair or just decisions.  As the title of this erudite yet engaging 
book suggests, Weale takes a social contract approach to identifying those conditions.  He is 
obviously not the first to do so.  Yet whereas most contemporary philosophers regard the 
social contract as a hypothetical thought experiment designed to make vivid our intuitions 
about democratic justice (e.g., Rawls 1971, 1996), Weale instead chooses to analyse the 
internal logic of empirical examples. 
 
This move will surely come as a surprise to many.  After all, one of the most familiar 
criticisms levelled at the social contract approach is that the social contract is an historical 
fiction—in most cases, states and their governments have originated not in contracts but in 
war and conquest.  Yet as far as the argument of Democratic Justice is concerned, this 
criticism does not bite.  Weale does not argue that modern democratic states originate in 
social contracts.  But he does argue that some local enterprises may do.  In particular, he 
thinks that some communities in which natural resources have to be managed in common 
may be thought to embody an implicit social contract—for example, a small logging 
community or fishing village (p. 47).  The local fishing waters may provide each fisherman 
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with his livelihood, but agreement on common rules is necessary if the resource is not to be 
depleted.  In other words, what is needed is a social contract to reconcile ‘the existence of 
separate and competing interests with the need to secure common interests’ (p. xii).   
 
Interestingly, in some such ‘common pool resource regimes’ (Ostrom 1990), the contract is 
made under conditions that resemble the conditions of a procedural democracy—inter alia, 
the contract is made by the fishermen themselves (as opposed to being imposed from 
outside), local knowledge informs their thinking, they recognise the need for monitoring and 
sanctions, and, most fundamentally of all, each participates in the negotiations from a 
position of roughly equal power.  Hence, what results is not merely a social contract, but a 
democratic social contract.  Yet even if one were to allow that some common pool resource 
regimes originate in democratic social contracts, the obvious question is how the analysis of 
such regimes bears on our understanding of the requirements of democratic justice in large 
modern democracies—or what Weale terms ‘great societies’ (a term that refers in the first 
instance to their scale rather than to their normative character).  His answer to this question 
has three main steps. 
 
First, Weale argues that as long as participants in the common pool resource regime are 
equally powerful, ‘the agreement that they make will incorporate principles of justice’ (p. 94; 
see also pp. xi, 5-6, 94).  It will incorporate principles of justice not because the members are 
concerned with questions of right or wrong, but because they have the foresight to realise that 
failure to agree a contract will harm their interests (p. 118).  In other words, justice is a by-
product of prudence.  The participants set out to agree a set of common rules governing their 
use of the common pool resource.  However, the fact that they are equally powerful means 
that the rules that they agree will comply with the demands of democratic justice, even 
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though none of them was guided by a concern for democratic justice.  The contrast here with 
John Rawls’s (1971, 2001) hypothetical approach is instructive.  While real people (‘you and 
I’', as Rawls is inclined to say) have a capacity for a sense of justice, the imaginary 
participants in the original position are concerned only to do the best they can for those whom 
they represent.  In other words, they are rational rather than reasonable.  Granted, Rawls does 
not say that they are unreasonable.  However, reasonableness is represented in the original 
position by the conditions of the original position itself.  In particular, Rawls places the 
participants behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ (thereby denying them knowledge of their social 
standing, educational attainment, physical attributes, ethnicity, religion etc.) in order to level 
the playing field.  Yet since empirical theories cannot employ the hypothetical device of a 
veil of ignorance, ‘there has to be some other way of ensuring that morally arbitrary 
differences of circumstance and ability do not distort the negotiation process’ (p. 98).  
According to Weale, the ‘assumption of equality of power, understood as equality of 
bargaining power, captures this requirement’ (p. 98). 
 
Secondly, while Weale argues that common pool resource regimes may be thought to model 
a just social contract, he also stresses that the precise sense in which they do so needs to be 
carefully understood.   As he explains, the use of common pool resource regimes as empirical 
models does not imply that those models are to be treated as blueprints for (the design or 
reform of) great societies; they are not a source of institutional prescription but are instead 
devices for thinking through the ‘logical connections of a theory’ (pp. 27, 217-218).  
Empirically, some common pool resource regimes display the features of a procedural 
democracy.  So, by examining such regimes, we get a better sense of how those features work 
together to deliver democratic justice (pp. 47, 51, 94, 130-132). 
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Thirdly, while ‘common pool resource regimes may provide empirical evidence about the 
agreements that would be made in a democratic contract for justice’, that evidence ‘cannot be 
applied without modification to the circumstances of other societies’ (p. 94). They are mere 
‘village republics’ rather than ‘great societies’ (p. 159).  Hence, the democratic characteristics 
of a common pool resource regime are only suggestive of what those characteristic might 
look like under the very different conditions of a great society (p. 62).  Put more negatively, 
the model is useful only insofar as its basic features can be scaled up, mutatis mutandis, to the 
level of a great society.  Weale thinks that they can be scaled up, and spends a great deal of 
time  explaining what the necessary modifications would look like.  For example, he argues 
that the ‘full fruits’ principle, according to which each fishermen can keep what he catches 
for himself, can be recast in terms of the modern welfare state.  While that might initially 
strike one as implausible, Weale argues that there is no difficulty here, since, properly 
understood, the modern welfare state is not based on a principle of distributive justice (pp. 
204-210).   
 
These three steps add up to a coherent argument.  Yet, as I will argue, there are reasons why a 
really great society—a society that is not just physically large or complex but also morally 
admirable—should be modelled on something more.  Common pool resource regimes can 
provide evidence about how a modern procedural democracy might generate principles of 
justice.  But what, one might wonder, would happen if equality of power could not simply be 
assumed?  Weale might say that such a question is out of bounds; all research is conducted 
within certain (more or less carefully specified) parameters.  His approach is to examine the 
internal logic of examples where equality of power can be assumed and then to see what that 
logic implies for modern democratic societies.  Yet while such an approach can teach us 
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much, cases where equality cannot be assumed are both too prevalent and too pressing to be 
set aside. 
 
Admittedly, Weale is not silent on how a sense of justice might take hold.  As he argues, 
justice ‘can be represented as a convention among persons of equal strength for their mutual 
advantage’ (p. xv).  To begin with, the fishermen consent to the social contract for prudential 
reasons.  Yet over time, and through the force of habit, they come to recognise the principles 
of justice it embodies as principles of justice (p. xv and chap. 8).  Sociologically, this may be 
how some of our most cherished norms and practices have come about—through social 
evolution rather than conscious intervention.  But sometimes a deliberate break with 
convention is exactly what is required.   
 
So, just as Weale’s approach seems to have little to say about cases in which equality cannot 
be assumed, it also has little to say about how a sense of justice might be consciously 
promoted.  That is because the particular conception of ‘deliberative rationality’ that we find 
in Democratic Justice is insufficient to the task.  Justice may emerge under conditions of 
equal bargaining power.  More generally, market interactions, in which actors are animated 
only by their own self-interest, can have socially beneficial outcomes.  Yet while bargaining 
can be construed as a form of deliberative rationality, just as Weale suggests, a richer, more 
normatively attractive, conception of deliberative rationality is required to consciously meet 
the challenges arising from unequal bargaining power.  In what follows, I look to the 
literature on deliberative democracy to make this latter case.  In particular, I argue that 
concerns about equality or fairness require us to shift from a bargaining mind-set to one in 
which each person gives no more weight to his own interests just because it is his interest 
than he gives to another’s interest.  After all, fairness is not just about being fair to oneself; it 
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is also about seeing things as others see them, understanding their reasons and weighing them 
in the balance equally with one’s own.   
 
Deliberative rationality 
 
Social contract theories are typically founded on the notion of the state as a ‘voluntary’ 
association.  Since political relations lack any natural basis, the natural state of humanity is 
pre-political.  By nature, all people are free and equal.  Yet because this ‘state of nature’ 
breeds insecurity, people consent to institute government, and cede certain powers to it, on 
the condition that the government consents to use those powers to ensure their collective 
security. 
 
The notion of the state as a ‘voluntary’ association is also central to Democratic Justice, 
where voluntary consent is defined as ‘action arising from deliberation’ (p. xiii).  The 
thinking behind this definition is obvious enough—to agree on what to do, the contracting 
parties must first deliberate together (p. 100).  It follows, therefore, that social contract 
theories must provide an account of what that deliberation involves and of the personal 
capabilities it presupposes (p. 96).  According to Weale, to deliberate rationally, the 
contracting parties must be capable of (1) reflective distance on the choices that confront 
them, (2) following a chain of reasoning to its conclusion, (3) judging which actions will 
serve their goals and (4) accepting that they may sometimes get it wrong (pp. 24-26, 103-
108). 
 
These four conditions are obviously very general.  For example, bargaining, which is how the 
participants in the common pool resource regime are said to make their contractual decisions 
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(pp. xiii, 98, 99, 101), is one way in which they might be realised.  Bargainers walk away 
from the negotiation table if they do not like the terms on offer (reflective distance), each side 
tries to convince the other that the deal is good for them (following a chain of reasoning), 
their thinking tends to be highly instrumental (actions serving goals), and they know that 
bargains will sometimes need to be revised (defeasible agreements).  Yet while Weale argues 
that justice emerges under conditions of equal bargaining power (pp. xi, 23, 26), the problem 
is that bargaining comes up short as a procedure for determining those conditions in the first 
place.  It is not that actors cannot bargain about matters of procedure.  A bargain may also 
generate fixed parameters that constrain future bargains.  Yet the fact remains that questions 
of fundamental fairness or equality cannot be answered from within a bargaining 
framework—to borrow a phrase from Russell Hardin, bargainers cannot ‘pull themselves up 
by their own bootstraps’ (Hardin 1991, p. 167).  It is simply the wrong type of procedure.   
 
We can see what is at issue here by comparing bargaining to deliberation, specifically as that 
latter term might be understood by someone working in the field deliberative democracy (see 
Gutmann and Thompson 2004 for an overview).  As Weale recognises, deliberation can also 
satisfy the broader conditions of deliberative rationality (p. 18).  However, there are some 
major differences between it and bargaining.  In essence, deliberation is a form of discussion 
in which the participants carefully weigh the reasons for or against a proposed measure in 
order to arrive together at a considered view.  So defined, deliberation presupposes a 
willingness on the part of the participants to listen to one another with an open mind rather 
than sticking doggedly to their own prior views and positions.  Insofar as this presupposition 
holds, the agreements that they reach will be based not on the balance of advantage but on the 
balance of argument.   
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By contrast, the aim in bargaining is not to arrive at a collective view of what is right or best, 
but to reach an agreement in which each side is happy to give up something in return for 
something else that it wants even more.  In a bargain, one side does not try to convince the 
other that the better arguments are on its side.  Rather, it tries to convince the other side of the 
advantages of accepting the terms that it is offering (pp. 56, 118; ref. to Smith 1976 [1776], p. 
27).  Assuming that both parties are equally free to walk away from the negotiation table, a 
bargain will be reached only when both of them consider it advantageous to do so (cf. Barry 
1990, p. 86).  If one or other of the parties can hold out for a better deal, then both sides will 
be simply left where they were before.  Yet while the parties must therefore take a broader 
‘prudential’ or ‘enlightened’ view than simply consulting their own interests (pp. 76, 102-
103), it is ultimately their own interests that concern them most. 
 
In recent years, there has been a move to accommodate bargaining within a broader 
deliberative framework (e.g., Mansbridge 2010).  In particular, deliberative theorists have 
argued that the terms under which bargaining proceeds should themselves be agreed through 
deliberation.  On one level, it is not hard to see why deliberative theorists should want to 
make this move.  While bargaining and deliberation are distinct activities, in practice they can 
be very hard to disentangle; both may feature in complex ways within a single decision-
making process.  But for another, the fact that there is so much bargaining in modern 
democracies means that any theory of democracy worth its salt must be able to say something 
meaningful about it.  There are, however, deeper grounds for arguing that bargaining should 
be located within a broader deliberative framework but which are often left unclear within the 
deliberative literature.  In other words, there are grounds for arguing that deliberation should 
be treated as fundamental.  Those grounds are especially relevant to our assessment of the 
argument of Weale’s Democratic Justice. 
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If someone were to claim that the social contract was unfair, the obvious thing to do would be 
ask them why.  They might say that it was unfair because it failed to treat some people as 
political equals.  Yet appeals to fairness or equality are not like the appeals that people make 
when they bargain with each other.  When two people bargain, each tries to convince the 
other that he is getting a good deal.  However, what each really wants is the best possible deal 
for himself.  By contrast, assessing the fairness of an arrangement requires each person to 
give no more weight to his own interests in the arrangement just because it is his interest than 
he gives to the other’s interest.  After all, fairness is not just about being fair to oneself (even 
if it is that, too); it is about seeing things as others see them, understanding their reasons and 
weighing them in the balance equally with one’s own.  This is not to suggest that deliberation 
is always desirable or even possible; sometimes people simply have conflicting interest (cf. p. 
187).  Yet while bargaining may sometimes be the best or only way forward, most of us 
would still want to say that bargains should be fair.  More specifically, the conditions under 
which a bargain takes place should be as fair as possible to all sides.  But that, as I have just 
argued, requires deliberation. 
 
In response, Weale might say that the worry here is overstated, since fairness is already built 
into the dual logic of the common pool approach.  Participants have an individual interest in 
catching as many fish as possible, but they also have a common interest in ensuring that fish 
stocks are not depleted (p. 77).  Consequently, they pursue their individual interests 
acknowledging the constraints of their collective interest.  One might take that to mean that 
each fisherman should seek no more than his fair share.  Yet the fact remains that fairness 
does not enter into their calculations: concerns of justice are not part of the their mental 
make-up (p. 118).  They may have a common interest in resource management, but that 
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interest is born of a pragmatic concession to reality.  Each fisherman would prefer to have 
exclusive use of the lake.  But since that is not possible, the constraints that the contract 
imposes are accepted as a matter of simple prudence or pragmatism. 
 
Method and practice 
 
The alternative to accepting the contract on pragmatic or prudential grounds is accepting its 
constraints or provisions because they are fair or just.  But that, as I have argued, requires 
deliberation, as does any questioning of their fairness at some future point.  So why, then, 
does Weale continue to emphasise bargaining over deliberation?  In Democratic Justice he 
offers us two reasons—one logical and one practical.  Let us take those reasons in turn. 
 
In an important passage, Weale tells us that we can distinguish between different social 
contract theories in terms of how they specify the conditions under which agreement is to be 
reached—or in terms of the particular conception of deliberative rationality that they employ.  
Thus, as he explains: 
In one conception, the negotiation is assumed to be one in which individuals are 
seeking to promote their interests over a baseline of non-cooperation, and for this 
reason they are looking to establish a social contract that is to their mutual advantage.  
In the contrasting conception, the negotiation is conceived of as an exchange of reasons 
that are to be considered from an impartial point of view by the participants in the 
contract.  The distinction between the two conceptions is thus one between a social 
contract as a form of mutual advantage and a social contract as a form of impartial 
discussion (p. 9). 
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The capacity for impartial reasoning can be explicated in different ways.  For example, the 
account that Jürgen Habermas provides is grounded in a broader theory of communicative 
action and is encapsulated in the principle that a valid reason is one that all those affected 
could accept (e.g., Habermas 1990).  That principle is common to many theories of 
deliberative democracy (e.g., Cohen 1996).  Yet as Weale points out, if that principle is 
treated as a requirement of democratic justice, as it typically is, the reasoning that underpins 
the deliberative social contract will be circular.  After all, the whole point of the social 
contract is to generate principles of justice (p. 13; see also Weale 2004, pp. 88, 91-92).  Of 
course, in practice, the circularity here may not be particularly vicious.  Yet logically there is 
clearly something amiss in claiming that principles of justice can only be determined through 
a procedure of impartial reasoning when it turns out that that procedure already presupposes a 
particular understanding of what justice demands. 
 
On the face of it, therefore, one can see why Weale is wary of deliberative democracy.  Any 
successful definition defines a word or concept in terms of some other words or concepts; we 
cannot legitimately use the word or concept we are trying to define as part of the definition 
itself.  For example, if we define birds as ‘feathered creatures’ and further define feathers as 
‘the outer layer of birds’, then our definition is circular and uninformative.  To a person who 
does not already know what a bird is, the definition says nothing.  Analogously, to avoid 
circularity, a theory of the social contract should not depend on a prior ability to identify 
principles of justice.  Unsurprisingly, Weale thinks that the empirical approach meets this 
logical requirement.  As he puts it, participants in an empirical social contract ‘seek for the 
advancement of their own interests.  The constraints that make the political agreement one of 
justice are not to be found in the motives of the agents, but in the circumstances in which they 
negotiate with potential associates’ (pp. 10-11, 13).  Unlike the circumstances of the original 
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position, the circumstances of the empirical social contract are real rather than imagined.  
Hence, the political theorist does not need to inject ideas about justice into his construal of 
the initial contractual situation.  Whereas Rawls is guided by an idea of justice in the very 
way he constructs the original position, ensuring that he gets out of the original position 
exactly what he puts into it, Weale has no need of such a move.  Yet while Weale’s definition 
of the social contract situation may not be circular, it arguably commits the fallacy of begging 
the question: equality is merely assumed rather than justified, an assumption which may be 
(empirically) warranted in common pool resource regimes, but which is often far from 
(empirically) warranted in great societies.  At the very least, one would have to question 
whether the common pool resource regime can serve as a model for thinking about principles 
of democratic justice when, in great societies, the presumption of equality may simply fail to 
hold.   
 
Of course, it might be responded that, in real terms, a model of democracy that stresses 
impartial deliberation is even more out of touch with the realities of political life in great 
societies than a model which stresses fair or equal bargaining.  In this spirit, Weale reminds 
us of the practical, as opposed to merely logical, difficulties of treating deliberative social 
contracts as models for actual democratic politics.  In particular, he draws our attention to the 
problem of scale: while the deliberative social contract models the idea that everyone should 
have (quite literally) an equal say, ‘in great societies this condition of participation cannot be 
met’ (pp. 160-161).  Their sheer scale is such that it would be impossible for their members 
to gather together in a single forum to debate the issues of the day.  Even if they could gather 
together, the inevitable time constraints under which most political decisions must be made 
would make it impossible for everyone to have his say or reflect seriously on the points raised 
by others (see, e.g., Goodin 2000, p. 82).  Consequently, we ‘merely have to suppose that 
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deliberated decisions could be the object of reasoned agreement, even if they are not in fact 
so’ (p. 161). 
 
Thus, for Weale, the problem of scale ‘recapitulates for deliberation the principal problem of 
hypothetical social contract theory.  It is one thing to find that people unanimously agree 
under some circumstances; it is another to suppose that they would agree without our having 
some independent evidence about what the terms of that agreement would be’ (p. 161).  
However, the prospects for deliberative democracy in great societies are better, or more 
promising, than Weale allows (notwithstanding what he has to say about the deliberative 
virtues of proportional representation).  Deliberative theorists recognise that no one 
deliberative arena can include everyone.  But they also recognise that deliberation goes on in 
many different places—not just within the institutions of the democratic state, but also within 
the institutions of civil society and the broader public sphere.  Admittedly, the quality of 
deliberation may vary from forum to forum.  But, for many deliberative democrats, what 
ultimately matters is the quality of the system as a whole (Habermas 1996, pp. 204-308; 
Dryzek 2010, 2012; Mansbridge et al. 2012).  
 
The literature on ‘deliberative systems’ is small.  The idea itself remains under-theorised (for 
example, does it really make sense to view every political act or institution through a 
deliberative lens?) and there is still very little sense of how a deliberative system might be 
empirically measured (for example, how exactly might we assess the extent to which, if 
indeed at all, deliberation in one arena influences deliberation in another?).   Nevertheless, 
the idea of a deliberative system may offer a genuine solution to the problem of scale.  To see 
how, and in the process to see why worries about the feasibility of deliberative democracy 
might be ameliorated, consider Weale’s discussion of partisanship. 
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According to Weale, in ‘discursive terms it is useful to think of public policy formation as a 
competition among different advocacy coalitions’ (p. 184).  Each of those coalitions seeks to 
promote the public good rather than seeking to promote its own special interests.  Thus, on 
the face of it, the Conservative Party is not merely a faction, since it really believes that it is 
doing what is right for society as a whole.  That is to say, whereas a faction appeals to a 
narrow constituency, a partisan party addresses a much wider constituency (White and Ypi 
2011, p. 383).  Yet while partisans try to persuade, they are not themselves open to 
persuasion.  They offer justifications for the positions that they advocate, but resist making 
those positions responsive to what others have to say—they may shift their positions for 
strategic reasons, but not because of any fundamental changes to their core beliefs and values.  
They may eventually bargain, but, by definition, they never deliberate. 
 
Weale sees partisanship as part of the democratic furniture of great societies.  He is surely 
right to do so.  Yet while he accepts that partisans typically talk past one another, and while 
he also accepts that such behaviour is bad for democracy, he doubts that this is really the 
serious problem that some people make it out to be (p. 185; see Weale et al. 2012 for an 
empirical analysis).  He may or may not be right in that.  But had he been less sceptical about 
the prospects for scaling deliberative democracy up to the level of a great society, he might 
have been able to make an even stronger case.  Partisanship clearly falls short of the 
deliberative ideal.  Yet from systems perspective, partisanship may nevertheless contribute to 
a society’s overall deliberative capacity.  Partisans may not be concerned to weigh competing 
arguments in the balance and assess them on their merits.  But they may nevertheless serve 
the deliberative purpose of articulating competing positions which others can then consider in 
the course of their own deliberations.  The fact that they address their arguments to society as 
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a whole means that they also further the cause of deliberative inclusion.  Viewed from this 
perspective, the issue is not the extent to which partisans talk past one another but the extent 
to which they encourage deliberation at other points in the system.  In short, practical worries 
about deliberative democracy may be overstated.  Conversely, bargaining may not be all that 
much more realistic after all. 
 
Moral motivation 
 
While Democratic Justice has much to teach us about what democratic justice would be like 
under conditions of political equality, it has much less to say about how those conditions 
might be secured in the first instance.  The reason why it has much less to say is because of 
the conception of deliberative rationality on which it relies: while bargaining can easily shade 
into coercion unless the conditions under which bargains are negotiated are roughly fair, fair 
conditions cannot themselves be determined through (fair) bargaining.  What is instead 
required is deliberation. Weale is sceptical about the prospects for deliberation in great 
societies; there are simply far too many of us to deliberate together.  Yet a systemic approach 
may allay such worries.   
 
Bargaining has another important limitation (although it is not clear that Weale would 
necessarily regard it as such).  As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, one of the central 
claims of Democratic Justice is that democratic justice ‘can be represented as a convention 
among persons of equal strength for their mutual advantage’ (p. xv; see also pp. xii, 115-116, 
224).   We initially agree to the social contract for prudential reasons, but over time we 
become accustomed to treating one another as political equals.  In other words, we internalise 
a sense of fairness.  Sociologically, that may be how things go (p. 234).  But from a 
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philosophical perspective, we would surely want something more.  Every great society—by 
which I mean a society worthy of our admiration as opposed to a society that is merely large 
in size—must form some conception of the kind of society that it is and would like to be.  It 
must decide what it stands for and what values it holds dear.  Of course, societies do not 
choose their values in a vacuum; tried and trusted conventions will certainly have a role to 
play.  But sometimes a society can only be truly great, or at least aspire to be so, by breaking 
with convention.   
 
One reason why Weale thinks that conventions are important is because institutions cannot 
do it all; as he puts it, to ‘secure stability, just practices need not only to be externally 
enforced but to be recognised from the inner point of view’ (p. 226).  That is certainly true.  
Yet if, among other things, a sense of justice is important because it involves our seeing 
things from others’ points of view, then a great society must make room for more than 
bargaining.  It must also make room for deliberation—and hence for deliberative institutions.  
Indeed, it must treat the creation and maintenance of deliberative institutions as one of its 
fundamental concerns.  Otherwise the danger is that justice will be left to chance.  Over time, 
just conventions may emerge and take root, such that people feel that there are right ways to 
behave towards one another.  But the likelihood of that happening is increased if we 
consciously prioritise deliberation—perhaps not everywhere, but surely at crucial points 
throughout the deliberative system.   
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